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WRITING FOR JUDGES
PIERRE SCHLAG*
In 1975, Herbert Wechsler told my constitutional law class that, as
a student at Columbia in the late 1920s, he and his classmates
treated the latest Holmes and Brandeis dissents as virtually sacred
texts to be read and studied.
Comments of Steven Winter 1
I despise the current Supreme Court and find its aggressive, willful,
statist behavior disgusting.
Comments of Guido Calabresi
Dean, Yale Law School 2
[We have better things to do with our time.
Comments of Sandy Levinson 3
Since the days of Christopher Columbus Langdell it has been in-
cumbent upon American legal academics to invest the signifier "law"
with a relatively autonomous identity, a certain degree of internal
complexity and at least a modicum of reproducible regularity. What
was required was the creation of a discipline entitled to recognition
within the American university. This, of course, was Langdell's
program:
I have tried to do my part towards making the teaching and the
study of law in that school worthy of a university .... To accom-
plish these objects, so far as they depended upon the law school, it
was indispensable to establish at least two things-that law is a
science, and that all the available materials of that science are con-
tained in printed books.4
Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law.
1. Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in Constitutional Law, 78 CAL. L.
REV. 1441, 1461 n.93 (1990).
2. Guido Calabresi, What Clarence Thomas Knows, N.Y. TiMES, July 28, 1991, § 4, at 15, as
cited in Sanford Levinson, The Audience for Constitutional Meta-Theory (Or Why, and to Whom, Do I
Write the Things I Do?) 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 389, 404 (1992).
3. Sanford Levinson, The Audience for Constitutional Meta-Theory (Or Why, and to Whom, Do I
Write the Things I Do?) 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 389, 406 (1992).
4. Christopher Columbus Langdell, Harvard Celebration Speeches, 3 LAW Q. REV. 118, 123-24
(1887).
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This Langdellian -program has been remarkably successful. It was re-
alized by means of a brilliant and radical reductionism-one whose
effects are still shaping the actors, the action and the scene of the legal
academy even today.
Two aspects of the Langdellian reduction were absolutely criti-
cal. 5 First was the reduction of all that might be called "law" to a
formalizable order of jurisprudential object-forms otherwise known as
"doctrine" and "principles." This reduction enabled the formalization
of "law" into a system of self-referential propositional statements.6
This systemic formalization enabled legal academics to stabilize and
close off that which we call "law" and to insulate this domain from the
other humanities.
The second critical aspect of the Langdellian reduction was the
confinement of the intellectual range and interest of the legal academic
to that of an imagined, highly idealized and much celebrated alter
ego-the persona of the appellate judge. The self-identification of the
legal academic with the appellate judge provided the legal academic
with a respectable and detached audience--one that would echo and
legitimate the legal academic's own professional ambition to portray
law as (at least) relatively autonomous. Equally important, this reduc-
tive self-identification with the persona of the appellate judge provided
the legal academic with a sense of professional importance and pur-
pose. Indeed, legal academics could understand themselves to be do-
ing something important because they understood themselves to be
important to the work of judges who in turn were portrayed by legal
academics as very important.
7
This then, in egregiously abridged form, was the Langdellian pro-
gram. It worked. To a large extent, it continues to work-success-
fully extending and rehearsing its own aesthetic, its own rhetoric, its
own ontology even in such purportedly dissident knowledge-practices
as legal realist functionalism, contemporary neo-pragmatism, feminist
jurisprudence and even deconstruction. 8 This appropriation and neu-
tralization of dissident knowledge-practices within the Langdellian
aesthetic has been extraordinarily effective. The Langdellian para-
5. For a more complete description of the Langdellian reduction, see Pierre Schlag, The Problem
of the Subject, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1627, 1632-62, 1726-43 (1991).
6. The perfected contemporary expression of this genre can be found in the various Restatements
of the ALI, various learned treatises or Gilberts.
7. The most florid contemporary expression of this professional self-aggrandizement can be found
in RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1988) (projecting the self-image of the legal academic onto the
persona of the appellate judge and then portraying the latter as "Hercules").
8. See generally, Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 801
(1991); Pierre Schlag, "Le Hors de Texte, C'est Moi": The Politics of Form and the Domestication of
Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1631 (1990).
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digm has shown a remarkable capacity to colonize and domesticate all
sorts of purportedly "novel" and "disruptive" "critical" knowledge-
practices.9
How much longer Langdellianism will continue to organize, mo-
tivate, and police the thinking practices of legal academics is becoming
an increasingly interesting question. While it would be (and indeed
repeatedly has been) a mistake to underestimate the power of Langdel-
lianism in shaping the knowledge-practices of legal academics, there
are, nonetheless, some hopeful signs.
Sandy Levinson's essay is one such hopeful sign. As Sandy's es-
say at once demonstrates and explains, the prototypical Langdellian
practice of writing for judges is increasingly beset by a kind of demor-
alization-a sense of futility and aimlessness.10 This demoralization of
the prototypical Langdellian practice is fueled by a complex of related
and mutually reinforcing recognitions. Here, I will mention three
recognitions that seem increasingly widespread among legal academics
and particularly important to the demoralization of the Langdellian
practice.
One recognition, aptly illustrated in Sandy Levinson's essay, is
the realization that judges are not listening to academic legal think-
ers." It is becoming increasingly apparent that the image of the judge
who conscientiously reads relevant academic literature is an aberra-
tion, not the general rule. Judges simply do not have the time to en-
gage in such exercises and it is doubtful that many have the interest.
For legal academics, one entailment of this recognition is the loss of
any instrumental pay-off in writing for judges. Indeed, the possibility
of influencing (as opposed to merely tracking, anticipating or legiti-
mating) judicial decision-making is now increasingly understood to be
extremely remote.
A second recognition also damaging to the prototypical Langdel-
lian practice of writing for judges is the dissolution of our shared ro-
mantic image of the judge as a jurisprudential giant. Indeed, against
the current cast of characters on the Supreme Court, Dworkin's Her-
cules seems increasingly out of place12-no longer does the appellate
judge appear to us as the contemporary equivalent of a Cardozo or a
Holmes or a Brandeis. Rather, the image that comes to mind is more
that of a harried bureaucrat caught in an endless doctrinal maze. The
9. See generally, Schlag, "Le Hors de Texte, C'est Moi," supra, note 8; Schlag, The Problem of the
Subject, supra, note 5.
10. Levinson, supra note 3, at 404-06.
11. Id. at 405-06.
12. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1988).
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resulting disaffection in the academic and the student audience is in-
creasingly apparent:
[W]e need note only that to the extent the writing of the judicial
branch, or of the lawyer giving advice on what the law is, is the
outcome of bureaucratic processes, to that extent it is in danger of
losing its claim upon us and failing to leave us with a sense of
obligation and willing obedience after we read and hear it ....
A third recognition that is also damaging to the prototypical
Langdellian practice of writing for judges is the rather widespread dis-
enchantment with the mind-numbing, doctrine-centered idiom used in
appellate opinions. Robert Nagel, for instance, describes the prevalent
style of constitutional doctrine as emphasizing
formalized doctrine expressed in elaborately layered sets of "tests"
or "prongs" or "requirements" or "standards" or "hurdles." The
judicial opinions in which these "analytical devices" appear tend
to be characterized by tireless, detailed debate among the
Justices. 14
This disaffection with the contemporary doctrinal idiom is echoed by
David Kennedy:
Doctrinal argument seems increasingly complex and ever less able
to determine outcomes. The normative moorings of the most basic
doctrinal discourse by lawyers, scholars and judges seem in-
firm.... The more diverse the sphere of an argument's application,
the thinner it seems to become until its manipulability becomes
more apparent than its persuasive clout. The result has been ever
more polarized arguments, ever more sophisticated doctrinal di-
versity, and ever more narrowly applicable holdings. 15
Richard Posner sums up these kinds of observations rather succinctly:
the opinions of judges and the writings of legislators are, he says, "es-
sentially mediocre texts."'
16
In sum, the academic practice of writing for judges increasingly
appears as a degraded art-form used to communicate with personas
who are not listening in order to achieve nothing very much whatso-
ever. One might reasonably conclude that this social practice is not
doing very well. 7
But what is interesting about these observations and what merits
13. Joseph Vining, Law and Enchantment: The Place of Belief, 86 MICH. L. REV. 577, 594 (1987).
14. Robert F. Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REV. 165 (1985) (footnote
omitted).
15. David Kennedy, Critical Theory, Structuralism and Contemporary Legal Scholarship, 21
NEw ENO. L. REV. 209, 211-12 (1986).
16. Id.
17. Levinson, supra note 3, at 404, 405-06.
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serious inquiry is not so much how the academic practice of writing
for judges has fallen on hard times, but rather the reverse: What re-
quires inquiry is how it is that this Langdellian practice could have
sustained and reproduced itself so successfully for so long. I think this
is a question that warrants serious thought-because in the answers
that emerge, we might have the beginnings of an understanding of
what "law" is and how "law" maintains itself.

